vCenter CVE-2026-123890: unauth bypass, zero-dayed since September

Broadcom shipped VMSA-2026-0009 Thursday, and CVE-2026-123890 inside it is the one to drop everything for: an unauthenticated authentication bypass in the VMware Directory Service, CVSS 9.8, no workaround. The same day, Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence published the rest of the story: a suspected China-nexus spy crew they track as Armory Castle used it as a zero-day against live vCenter servers starting in early September. More than two months of runway against your hypervisor management plane. CISA has not added it to KEV as of the November 18 catalog, but CISA has put ten earlier vCenter flaws on that list, and a bug a state crew has been driving through vmdird since early September carries better exploitation evidence than any published PoC.
The chain is a study in one team, many zero-days. Armory Castle got initial access through CVE-2026-102764, their August zero-day in BeyondTrust Remote Support, then tunneling and a foothold on an internal Linux appliance that lacked EDR. Root came from flipping the SUID bit on /bin/env with gdb. A battery of new malware followed: SLIMSAVAGE and CAGEMATCH webshells, the BEARBONES and LAZYBONES backdoors, and BONESAW, a Golang exploitation utility. The group nmap-hunts the net for the vCenter SSO ports (9080, 5480, 2012), and the bug runs over DCE/RPC port 2012: the SRP-6a session key is disclosed without knowing any password, and the attacker lands an authenticated session as administrator@vsphere.local. From there BONESAW streams out the directory database (/storage/db/vmware-vmdir/data.mdb), hijacks the SAML STS, and creates its own SSO admin account. A second tool, SAWSNAKE, forges SAML tokens; more malware takes the vCenter master encryption key and database credentials, and the intrusion reaches ESXi itself. Mandiant investigated multiple incidents and notes BONESAW works against vCenter 7.x and 8.x. One detail deserves a pause: the recovered BONESAW binary carries a Go build timestamp of July 13, sixteen days before the July 29 disclosure of the previous vCenter auth bypass, CVE-2026-59309. Mandiant cautions Go build metadata can be modified, but the logged execution hit a vCenter server already patched for that earlier flaw.
The bug itself, per the NVD record, is CWE-288, authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel. Network access is the only precondition Broadcom lists.
Scope and fixes: vCenter 9.1.x takes 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.x takes 9.0.2.0200, 8.0 takes 8.0 U3m, and Cloud Foundation 5.x gets an async patch in 5.2.5 (KB88287); Telco Cloud Platform and Telco Cloud Infrastructure track KB463116. vCenter 7.0 has no public patch; if you run it, your option is extended support, which is a purchasing conversation now. Four siblings rode along in the same advisory: SQL injection, command injection and a root privesc in SDDC Manager, plus a SAML token signature bypass in VMware Tools on Windows guests using Guest Alias mapping, all Moderate-to-Important. The Tools one matters more than its 6.7 says it does: forged SAML tokens and VMware Tools belong in the same sentence.
Exploit status: no KEV entry yet, catalog still at November 18; Mandiant says a small set of organizations is compromised so far and that BONESAW looks built for broader operations. Patch every vCenter, then use the YARA rules and hunting guidance in the Mandiant post, and look for SSO accounts nobody created.
My read: vCenter keeps being the door that turns one appliance bug into the whole estate, because vCenter is also the identity provider. The SAML STS hijack is the lesson; the LMDB walk-out is the bill.
Questions or war stories: info@stackref.com.
This post was created with a Hermes AI agent (hermesagent.ai) from a weekly news gathering workflow, then reviewed and approved by Keith before publication.

